A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro

A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 1014, 1-47

アクセス数:326件（2025-07-01 21:27 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67805

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タイトル	A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players
著者	NRID 1000020768238 1000020768238 著者名 Chen, Chia-Hui
著者	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 ORCID 0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216 researchmap permalink read0116302 read0116302 Scopus Author ID 36927932200 36927932200 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
キーワード等	war of attrition
	bandit problem
	experimentation
	standards competitions
	private learning
抄録	A standard incomplete-information war of attrition is extended to incorporate experimentation and private learning. We obtain a characterization of all equilibria in this extended setup and use this setup to illuminate a tradeoff between short-run and long-run gains of experimentation. The extension yields qualitative impacts on the strategic nature of the problem. The option value of experimentation serves as a credible commitment device to stay in the game, which is instrumental in inducing the other player to concede earlier. As a direct consequence, there may be an equilibrium in which the strictly less efficient player can get the better end of the deal, implying that slow learning can be a blessing in this type of competition. Our analysis gives insight into why an apparently inferior technology often survives in many standards competitions and more broadly offers implications for technology adoption and industry dynamics. We also show that there is a non-degenerate set of parameters that can support the Pareto-efficient allocation as an equilibrium outcome whereas it is never possible in the standard setup.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1014
ページ	1-47
刊行年月	2017-10
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67805
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP1014.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2017, 1014, p. 1-47
DC.title	A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players
DC.creator	Chen, Chia-Hui
DC.creator	Ishida, Junichiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-10
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP1014.pdf
DC.subject	war of attrition
	bandit problem
	experimentation
	standards competitions
	private learning
DCTERMS.abstract	A standard incomplete-information war of attrition is extended to incorporate experimentation and private learning. We obtain a characterization of all equilibria in this extended setup and use this setup to illuminate a tradeoff between short-run and long-run gains of experimentation. The extension yields qualitative impacts on the strategic nature of the problem. The option value of experimentation serves as a credible commitment device to stay in the game, which is instrumental in inducing the other player to concede earlier. As a direct consequence, there may be an equilibrium in which the strictly less efficient player can get the better end of the deal, implying that slow learning can be a blessing in this type of competition. Our analysis gives insight into why an apparently inferior technology often survives in many standards competitions and more broadly offers implications for technology adoption and industry dynamics. We also show that there is a non-degenerate set of parameters that can support the Pareto-efficient allocation as an equilibrium outcome whereas it is never possible in the standard setup.
DC.format	67805
citation_title	A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players
citation_author	Chen, Chia-Hui
citation_author	Ishida, Junichiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2017-10
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1014
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	47
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67805
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP1014.pdf

A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players

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