Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines : The Role of Commitment

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 1015, 1-47

アクセス数:342件（2025-07-10 01:09 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67806

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines : The Role of Commitment
著者
NRID
1000020768238 1000020768238
著者名
Chen, Chia-Hui
NRID
1000040324222 1000040324222
ORCID
0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216
researchmap permalink
read0116302 read0116302
Scopus Author ID
36927932200 36927932200
著者名
Ishida, Junichiro
キーワード等
dynamic agency
deadlines
experimentation
commitment
up-or-out contracts
抄録
We consider an environment in which a principal hires an agent and evaluates his productivity over time in an ongoing relationship. The problem is embedded in a continuoustime model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to facilitate her learning process. The value of committing to a deadline is examined in this environment, and factors which make the deadline more profitable are identified. Our framework generates a unique recursive equilibrium structure under no commitment which can be exploited to obtain a full characterization of equilibrium. The analysis allows us to evaluate the exact value of commitment for any given set of parameters and provides insight into when it is beneficial to commit to an evaluation deadline at the outset of a relationship.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1015
ページ
1-47
刊行年月
2017-10
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67806
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP1015.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers