Naked Exclusion under Exclusive-offer Competition

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2018, 1021, 1-40

アクセス数:171件（2025-03-23 21:00 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67812

論文情報

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タイトル
Naked Exclusion under Exclusive-offer Competition
著者
NRID
1000030582415 1000030582415
著者名
Kitamura, Hiroshi
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070794585 1000070794585
著者名
Sato, Misato
キーワード等
Antitrust policy
Exclusive dealing
Exclusive-offer competition
Imperfect competition
抄録
This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm’s profit depends on the rival’s exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the upstream firm is excluded unless it succeeds in exclusion. Consequently, the upper bound of exclusive offers becomes higher than when one of the upstream firms is a potential entrant that cannot make any exclusive offer.Thus, the exclusion of the existing upstream firm can be an equilibrium outcome even in the case where the potential entrant is never excluded.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1021
ページ
1-40
刊行年月
2018-03
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67812
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2018/DP1021.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers