A manufacturer’s incentive to open its direct channel and its impact on welfare

Matsushima, Noriaki; Mizuno, Tomomichi; Pan, Cong

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2018, 1026, 1-19

アクセス数:174件（2025-03-26 17:24 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/68198

論文情報

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タイトル
A manufacturer’s incentive to open its direct channel and its impact on welfare
著者
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000060589315 1000060589315
著者名
Mizuno, Tomomichi
NRID
1000030807425 1000030807425
著者名
Pan, Cong
キーワード等
distribution channels
supplier encroachment
two-part tariff contract
welfare
抄録
We consider a bilateral monopoly in which a manufacturer can open its direct channel that is less efficient than the existing retailer. We find the following results. The manufacturer opens its direct channel if its bargaining power over the existing retailer is weak. Opening the direct channel is detrimental to social welfare if this channel is efficient. Under a linear demand specification, if the equilibrium unit price under such opening is higher than that under no opening, the opening reduces social welfare under most of the parameter range of the efficiency of the manufacturer’s direct channel.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1026
ページ
1-19
刊行年月
2018-03-27
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/68198
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2018/DP1026.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers