A Puzzle about Simple Sentences and a New Perspective on Proper Names

タンブン ノ パズル ト コユウメイ ニツイテ ノ アラタナ シテン

コヤマ, トラ

Koyama, Tora

オオサカ ダイガク ニンゲン カガクブ シャカイガク ニンゲンガク ジンルイガク ケンキュウシツ

英語

信念のパズル

ラッセリアンとフレーゲアン

メレオロジー

時間的部分

simple sentence

the puzzle about belief

Russellian and Fregean

mereology

temporal part

Jennifer Saul presented a puzzle. It is similar to the puzzle about-belief, but in simple sentences that are far from. propositional attitudes. Certainly, as she said, this puzzle has common features with the puzzle about belief. Thus, its connection with theories argued before should be considered. Seeing details of arguments by Saul and her opposites, it gets clear two approaches conflicting in the controversy about belief sentences emerges there as is. However, it gets also clear that neo- Russellians (which Saul belongs to) give weight to an intuition that co-referential proper names must talk about one and the same person,, and that neo-Fregeans (which the opposites belong to) give weight to another one that substitution of co-referential names must failure unless some conditions meet. So, we should seek another perspective that has points that the two approaches have. Under this consideration, the solution using mereology can be regarded as a new solution of the puzzle about simple sentences. Since this solution connects closely the ontology of temporal parts, it may be thought to bring new problems. But, I think, the problem of identity across time cannot be avoided in order to think about the puzzle about simple sentences.

英語