Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale : An Ex-Ante Price Default Model

Cheny, Weiye

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale : An Ex-Ante Price Default Model

Cheny, Weiye

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2018, 18-24, 1-25

アクセス数:115件（2025-07-09 22:20 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70126

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タイトル	Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale : An Ex-Ante Price Default Model
著者	著者名 Cheny, Weiye
キーワード等	Mechanism design
	Bankruptcy
	Endogenous bankruptcy
	recovery
	Resale
抄録	This paper investigates the optimal ex-ante price mechanism design of selling a single indivisible object in a market that comprises one public risky buyer and one regular risky buyer under unlimited or limited liability where resale is allowed. First, we propose an endogenous liquidation rule requiring that the public buyer acquires the object in the liquidation stage. Next, we design an optimal bankruptcy transfer to prevent the buyer's strategic default. On the basis of this liquidation rule, the optimal ex-ante price mechanism is designed to achieve the seller's upper bound revenue under unlimited and limited liability when resale cannot be prohibited prior to the liquidation stage. Comparing the two mechanisms, the results illustrate that the effect on the seller's behavior and that revenue over the liability and information change in each case. In other words, (i) when faced with limited liability buyers, the regular buyer will obtain the object in the initial market, whereas they will become the loser under the unlimited liability case; (ii) the seller's expected revenue under unlimited liability is weakly higher than that under limited liability; and (iii) when faced with the risky buyer, the seller prefers the buyer's resale behavior and is averse to the speculator only under the limited liability case.
出版者	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
収録物名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)	18-24
ページ	1-25
刊行年月	2018-07
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70126
NCID	AA1160366X
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1824.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2018, 18-24, p. 1-25
DC.title	Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale : An Ex-Ante Price Default Model
DC.creator	Cheny, Weiye
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2018-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1824.pdf
DC.subject	Mechanism design
	Bankruptcy
	Endogenous bankruptcy
	recovery
	Resale
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper investigates the optimal ex-ante price mechanism design of selling a single indivisible object in a market that comprises one public risky buyer and one regular risky buyer under unlimited or limited liability where resale is allowed. First, we propose an endogenous liquidation rule requiring that the public buyer acquires the object in the liquidation stage. Next, we design an optimal bankruptcy transfer to prevent the buyer's strategic default. On the basis of this liquidation rule, the optimal ex-ante price mechanism is designed to achieve the seller's upper bound revenue under unlimited and limited liability when resale cannot be prohibited prior to the liquidation stage. Comparing the two mechanisms, the results illustrate that the effect on the seller's behavior and that revenue over the liability and information change in each case. In other words, (i) when faced with limited liability buyers, the regular buyer will obtain the object in the initial market, whereas they will become the loser under the unlimited liability case; (ii) the seller's expected revenue under unlimited liability is weakly higher than that under limited liability; and (iii) when faced with the risky buyer, the seller prefers the buyer's resale behavior and is averse to the speculator only under the limited liability case.
DC.format	70126
citation_title	Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale : An Ex-Ante Price Default Model
citation_author	Cheny, Weiye
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2018-07
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	18-24
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	25
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70126
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1824.pdf

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale : An Ex-Ante Price Default Model

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