An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Mukherjee, Arijit

An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Mukherjee, Arijit

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2018, 1043, 1-34

アクセス数:461件（2025-11-04 12:23 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70606

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タイトル	An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
著者	NRID 1000020768238 1000020768238 著者名 Chen, Chia-Hui
	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 ORCID 0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216 researchmap permalink read0116302 read0116302 Scopus Author ID 36927932200 36927932200 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
	著者名 Mukherjee, Arijit
キーワード等	market entry
	market competition
	private learning
	signaling
	entry timing
抄録	This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and secondmover advantages in a unified framework. We characterize symmetric Markov perfect equilibria and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the first-mover advantage to dominate, which elucidates when and under what conditions a firm becomes a pioneer, an early follower or a late entrant. We also derive equilibrium payoff bounds to show that pioneering entry is generally payoff-enhancing, even though it is driven by preemption motives, and discuss efficiency properties of entry dynamics.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1043
ページ	1-34
刊行年月	2018-10-26
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70606
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2018, 1043, p. 1-34
DC.title	An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
DC.creator	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Mukherjee, Arijit
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2018-10-26
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf
DC.subject	market entry
	market competition
	private learning
	signaling
	entry timing
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and secondmover advantages in a unified framework. We characterize symmetric Markov perfect equilibria and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the first-mover advantage to dominate, which elucidates when and under what conditions a firm becomes a pioneer, an early follower or a late entrant. We also derive equilibrium payoff bounds to show that pioneering entry is generally payoff-enhancing, even though it is driven by preemption motives, and discuss efficiency properties of entry dynamics.
DC.format	70606
citation_title	An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
citation_author	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Mukherjee, Arijit
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2018-10-26
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1043
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	34
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70606
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf

An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

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