紀要論文

紀要論文

text

待兼山論叢. 哲学篇. 2017, 51, p. 53-68

日本語

text

2017-12-25

Problems related to hate speech and xenophobia have recently become the focus of increasing attention throughout the world. In the United States, in particular, issues regarding freedom of speech and the regulation of hate speech have generated considerable controversy. Although similar debates have been occurring in Japan, they have been eclipsed by agreement on an overarching issue: namely, how to oppose “genocide”. Indeed, genocide poses a threat to all humans and is a tragedy we must strive to avoid. At the 1993 Oxford-Amnesty lectures devoted to genocide during the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, Richard Rorty criticized “human rights foundationalism”. Rorty noted that attempts to base arguments in support of human rights on essentialist understandings of human nature are useless in efforts to oppose actual genocide. Instead, essentialism plays a key role in justifying the dehumanization of the victims of real-life genocide by lending credibility to the insider/outsider distinction. Under the banner of anti-essentialism, Rorty recommended the development of a program of “sentimental education” designed to encourage individuals to sympathize with one another, especially with those who are not included in the traditional definitions of “us, the insiders”. Although this is a very interesting idea, Rorty did not ground it in a detailed argument, saying only that a sentimental education is acquired through good fiction and journalism. However, we can elaborate this the argument based on the thinking of Rorty’s neopragmatist successors. To this end, we adopt Robert Brandom’s inferentialism and his analysis of singular terms because a sentimental education involves the substitution of new singular terms for such familiar labels as “us, the insiders”. In this paper, we attempt to elucidate Rorty’ s conception of a sentimental education based on Brandom’s argument about singular terms.

71387

ジェノサイドに抗するための、R. ローティ「感情教育」論再考

朱, 喜哲

大阪大学大学院文学研究科

日本語

2017-12-25

待兼山論叢. 哲学篇

51

53

68

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/71387