Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2019, 1047, 1-53

アクセス数:377件（2025-07-08 18:13 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/72991

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タイトル	Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market
著者	NRID 1000040807450 1000040807450 著者名 Zhou, Yu
著者	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	Assignment market
	minimum price equilibrium
	income effects
	Serial Vickrey process
	housing market
抄録	We investigate an assignment market in which multiple objects are assigned, together with associated payments, to a group of agents with unit demand preferences. Preferences over bundles, the pairs of (object, payment), accommodate income effects. Among all (Walrasian) equilibria in such a market, there is one supported by the coordinate-wise minimum prices, the minimum price equilibrium (MPE). We propose a price adjustment process, “the Serial Vickrey process,” that finds an MPE in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey process introduces objects one by one, and on the basis of the structural properties of MPE, the “Serial Vickrey sub-process” sequentially finds an MPE for k + 1 objects by using an MPE for k objects. In the Serial Vickrey process, instead of revealing the whole preference, each agent only reports finitely many “indifference prices.” We also discuss the application of the Serial Vickrey process to calibrate agents' utility functions in the quantitative analysis of housing market research in the assignment model.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1047
ページ	1-53
刊行年月	2019-01
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/72991
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1047.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2019, 1047, p. 1-53
DC.title	Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market
DC.creator	Zhou, Yu
DC.creator	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2019-01
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1047.pdf
DC.subject	Assignment market
	minimum price equilibrium
	income effects
	Serial Vickrey process
	housing market
DCTERMS.abstract	We investigate an assignment market in which multiple objects are assigned, together with associated payments, to a group of agents with unit demand preferences. Preferences over bundles, the pairs of (object, payment), accommodate income effects. Among all (Walrasian) equilibria in such a market, there is one supported by the coordinate-wise minimum prices, the minimum price equilibrium (MPE). We propose a price adjustment process, “the Serial Vickrey process,” that finds an MPE in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey process introduces objects one by one, and on the basis of the structural properties of MPE, the “Serial Vickrey sub-process” sequentially finds an MPE for k + 1 objects by using an MPE for k objects. In the Serial Vickrey process, instead of revealing the whole preference, each agent only reports finitely many “indifference prices.” We also discuss the application of the Serial Vickrey process to calibrate agents' utility functions in the quantitative analysis of housing market research in the assignment model.
DC.format	72991
citation_title	Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market
citation_author	Zhou, Yu
citation_author	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2019-01
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1047
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	53
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/72991
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1047.pdf

Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market

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