Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, 1060, 1-ⅱ

アクセス数:414件（2025-07-13 19:59 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73005

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル	Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation
著者	NRID 1000020768238 1000020768238 著者名 Chen, Chia-Hui
	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 ORCID 0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216 researchmap permalink read0116302 read0116302 Scopus Author ID 36927932200 36927932200 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
	著者名 Suen, Wing
キーワード等	double-crossing property
	dynamic signaling
	venture startups
内容	2019-07. Revised Aug 2020.
抄録	High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1060
ページ	1-ⅱ
刊行年月	2020-08
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73005
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1060R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2020-08

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, 1060, p. 1-ⅱ
DC.title	Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation
DC.creator	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Suen, Wing
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-08
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1060R.pdf
DC.subject	double-crossing property
	dynamic signaling
	venture startups
DC.description	2019-07. Revised Aug 2020.
DCTERMS.abstract	High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.
DC.format	73005
citation_title	Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation
citation_author	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Suen, Wing
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-08
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1060
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	ⅱ
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73005
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1060R.pdf

Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation

論文情報

論文詳細を表示