Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan

Kojima, Kenta; Takii, Katsuya

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2019, DP-2019-E-008, 1-46

アクセス数:367件（2025-07-10 00:15 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73192

論文情報

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タイトル
Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan
著者
NRID
1000000634247 1000000634247
著者名
Kojima, Kenta
NRID
1000070346138 1000070346138
researchmap permalink
k-takii k-takii
Scopus Author ID
6603896348 6603896348
著者名
Takii, Katsuya
キーワード等
Internal labor market
Career paths
Promotion
Fast track
Bureaucracy
抄録
This paper develops a novel method that assigns a job a value to capture both the likelihood and speed of promotion from each job to a top executive and applies it to investigate the career paths of bureaucrats in Japan. We find that outwardly similar jobs within the same hierarchical rank, estimated using the standard method in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), have very different opportunities to be promoted to a top executive. We can also detect frequent real demotions and the presence of early selection (read fast track) of elite bureaucrats unable to be detected through use of hierarchical rank.
出版者
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
収録物名
OSIPP Discussion Paper
巻(号)
DP-2019-E-008
ページ
1-46
刊行年月
2019-08-26
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73192
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2019/DP2019E008.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper