Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan

Kojima, Kenta; Takii, Katsuya

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論文情報

タイトル	Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan
著者	Kojima, Kenta Kojima, Kenta
著者	Takii, Katsuya Takii, Katsuya
キーワード等	Internal labor market
	Career paths
	Promotion
	Fast track
	Bureaucracy
抄録	This paper develops a novel method that assigns a job a value to capture both the likelihood and speed of promotion from each job to a top executive and applies it to investigate the career paths of bureaucrats in Japan. We find that outwardly similar jobs within the same hierarchical rank, estimated using the standard method in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), have very different opportunities to be promoted to a top executive. We can also detect frequent real demotions and the presence of early selection (read fast track) of elite bureaucrats unable to be detected through use of hierarchical rank.
公開者	Osaka School of International Public Policy
掲載誌名	OSIPP Discussion Paper
巻	DP-2019-E-008
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	46
刊行年月	2019-08-26
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/73192
関連情報 (references)	http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2019/DP2019E008.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	OSIPP Discussion Paper.DP-2019-E-008 P.1-P.46
DC.title	Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan
DC.creator	Kojima, Kenta
DC.creator	Takii, Katsuya
DC.publisher	Osaka School of International Public Policy
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2019-08-26
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/73192
DC.subject	Internal labor market
	Career paths
	Promotion
	Fast track
	Bureaucracy
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper develops a novel method that assigns a job a value to capture both the likelihood and speed of promotion from each job to a top executive and applies it to investigate the career paths of bureaucrats in Japan. We find that outwardly similar jobs within the same hierarchical rank, estimated using the standard method in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), have very different opportunities to be promoted to a top executive. We can also detect frequent real demotions and the presence of early selection (read fast track) of elite bureaucrats unable to be detected through use of hierarchical rank.
citation_title	Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan
citation_author	Kojima, Kenta
citation_author	Takii, Katsuya
citation_publisher	Osaka School of International Public Policy
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2019-08-26
citation_journal_title	OSIPP Discussion Paper
citation_volume	DP-2019-E-008
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	46
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/73192
citation_keywords	Internal labor market
	Career paths
	Promotion
	Fast track
	Bureaucracy

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