Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters

Arawatari, Ryo; Ono, Tetsuo

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2019, 19-14, 1-40

アクセス数:603件（2026-02-16 05:42 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73363

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters
著者
NRID
1000020547335 1000020547335
著者名
Arawatari, Ryo
NRID
1000050305661 1000050305661
ORCID
0000-0002-9838-828X 0000-0002-9838-828X
researchmap permalink
tono tono
Scopus Author ID
7403947415 7403947415
著者名
Ono, Tetsuo
キーワード等
Debt ceilings
Present bias
Public debt
抄録
This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy when a violation of debt rules is possible. To address this issue, the study extends the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (American Economic Review 105, (2015), 1711–1737) by allowing for rule breaking with extra costs, and we show that rule breaking occurs when a country exhibits a strong present bias. We further extend the model by introducing a political process for determining the debt rule, and we show that a polarization of debt rules emerges between countries with high and low degrees of present bias.
出版者
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
収録物名
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)
19-14
ページ
1-40
刊行年月
2019-10
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73363
NCID
AA1160366X
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/1914.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business