Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing

Kamijo, Yoshio; Masuda, Takehito; Uemura, Hiroshi

Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing

Kamijo, Yoshio; Masuda, Takehito; Uemura, Hiroshi

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2019, 1064, 1-14

アクセス数:188件（2025-05-18 19:00 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73365

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タイトル	Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing
著者	NRID 1000040453972 1000040453972 著者名 Kamijo, Yoshio
	NRID 1000080725060 1000080725060 著者名 Masuda, Takehito
	NRID 1000010710189 1000010710189 著者名 Uemura, Hiroshi
キーワード等	audit rule
	tax evasion
	laboratory experiment
	cut-off rule
	lowest income reporter audited rule
抄録	We employed a game-theoretic framework to formulate and analyze a number of tax audit rules, especially the lowest income reporter audited rule. We explicitly considered the auditor’s resource constraint to choose one target from a continuous type of taxpayer. We then tested the theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment, using three audit rules: the random, cut-off, and lowest income reporter audited rules. While the cut-off rule is known to be optimal in theory, it has not thus far been examined in a controlled laboratory experimental setting. Contrary to the theory, the lowest income reporter audited rule increased average compliance behavior significantly more compared with the optimal cut-off rule and, especially, the random rule. This holds with and without controlling the subjects’ demographics and attitudes regarding tax payment. This finding is practically important because the tax authorities in most countries assign higher priority to enhancing tax compliance.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1064
ページ	1-14
刊行年月	2019-10
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73365
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1064.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2019, 1064, p. 1-14
DC.title	Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing
DC.creator	Kamijo, Yoshio
	Masuda, Takehito
	Uemura, Hiroshi
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2019-10
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1064.pdf
DC.subject	audit rule
	tax evasion
	laboratory experiment
	cut-off rule
	lowest income reporter audited rule
DCTERMS.abstract	We employed a game-theoretic framework to formulate and analyze a number of tax audit rules, especially the lowest income reporter audited rule. We explicitly considered the auditor’s resource constraint to choose one target from a continuous type of taxpayer. We then tested the theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment, using three audit rules: the random, cut-off, and lowest income reporter audited rules. While the cut-off rule is known to be optimal in theory, it has not thus far been examined in a controlled laboratory experimental setting. Contrary to the theory, the lowest income reporter audited rule increased average compliance behavior significantly more compared with the optimal cut-off rule and, especially, the random rule. This holds with and without controlling the subjects’ demographics and attitudes regarding tax payment. This finding is practically important because the tax authorities in most countries assign higher priority to enhancing tax compliance.
DC.format	73365
citation_title	Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing
citation_author	Kamijo, Yoshio
	Masuda, Takehito
	Uemura, Hiroshi
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2019-10
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1064
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	14
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73365
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1064.pdf

Who is audited? Experimental study of rule-based tax auditing

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