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Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2020, 19-15-Rev., p. 1-26

Coordination and free-riding problems in the provision of multiple public goods

Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

英語

text

2020-06

http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/1915R.pdf

* Revised： [19-15 , 2019]

This study considers the twin problems of free riding and coordination failure prevailing in the provision of multiple public goods with diminishing marginal returns in which the payoff-summaximising Pareto optimal outcome requires less-than-full contributions by group members. We examine theoretically and experimentally whether the provision of information on the demand for public goods helps overcome these problems and improves efficiency. We construct a game of two public goods, each with an upper bound on effective contributions. Theoretical analysis predicts that this information improves efficiency as it prompts efficiency concerned individuals to match the upper bound of each public good in equilibrium. The experimental results show countervailing effects of demand information,i.e.,it improves coordination but deteriorates the free-riding problem.

73432

Coordination and free-riding problems in the provision of multiple public goods

Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

英語

2020-06

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

19-15-Rev.

1

26

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73432

http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/1915R.pdf