Matching Platforms

Aoyagi, Masaki; Seung, Han Yoo

Matching Platforms

Aoyagi, Masaki; Seung, Han Yoo

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2019, 1072, 1-46

アクセス数:108件（2025-03-18 07:00 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73685

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タイトル	Matching Platforms
著者	NRID 1000050314430 1000050314430 ORCID 0000-0003-0647-3733 0000-0003-0647-3733 researchmap permalink Masaki_Aoyagi Masaki_Aoyagi Scopus Author ID 7201467696 7201467696 著者名 Aoyagi, Masaki ; アオヤギ, マサキ ; 青柳, 真樹
著者	著者名 Seung, Han Yoo
キーワード等	assortative
	random
	auction
	subscription
	revenue maximization
	complementarity
抄録	A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. The agents subscribe to the platform by paying subscription fees which are contingent on their reported private types, and then engage in strategic interactions with their matched partner(s). A matching mechanism of the platform specifies the subscription fees as well as the matching rule which determines the probability that each type of agent on one side is matched with each type on the other side. We characterize optimal matching mechanisms which induce truthful reporting from the agents and maximize the subscription revenue. We show that the optimal mechanisms for a one-to-one trading platform match do not necessarily entail assortative matching, and may employ an alternative matching rule that maximizes the extraction of informational rents of the higher type. We then study an auction platform that matches each seller to two agents, and show that the optimal mechanism entails the combination of negative and positive assortative matching.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1072
ページ	1-46
刊行年月	2019-12
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73685
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1072.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2019, 1072, p. 1-46
DC.title	Matching Platforms
DC.creator	Aoyagi, Masaki
	アオヤギ, マサキ
	青柳, 真樹
	Seung, Han Yoo
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2019-12
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1072.pdf
DC.subject	assortative
	random
	auction
	subscription
	revenue maximization
	complementarity
DCTERMS.abstract	A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. The agents subscribe to the platform by paying subscription fees which are contingent on their reported private types, and then engage in strategic interactions with their matched partner(s). A matching mechanism of the platform specifies the subscription fees as well as the matching rule which determines the probability that each type of agent on one side is matched with each type on the other side. We characterize optimal matching mechanisms which induce truthful reporting from the agents and maximize the subscription revenue. We show that the optimal mechanisms for a one-to-one trading platform match do not necessarily entail assortative matching, and may employ an alternative matching rule that maximizes the extraction of informational rents of the higher type. We then study an auction platform that matches each seller to two agents, and show that the optimal mechanism entails the combination of negative and positive assortative matching.
DC.format	73685
citation_title	Matching Platforms
citation_author	Aoyagi, Masaki
citation_author	Seung, Han Yoo
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2019-12
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1072
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	46
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73685
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2019/DP1072.pdf

Matching Platforms

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