Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility

Kato, Ryo; Tsuruga, Takayuki

Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility

Kato, Ryo; Tsuruga, Takayuki

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, 1078, 1-32

アクセス数:458件（2025-09-03 13:35 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/75942

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タイトル	Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility
著者	著者名 Kato, Ryo
著者	NRID 1000040511720 1000040511720 ORCID 0000-0002-8177-2330 0000-0002-8177-2330 researchmap permalink 7000008934 7000008934 Scopus Author ID 16424964300 16424964300 著者名 Tsuruga, Takayuki
キーワード等	Financial crisis
	Liquidity shortage
	Maturity mismatch
	Credit externalities
	Financial regulation
抄録	Pecuniary externalities in models with nancial friction justify macroprudential policies for preventing economic agentsexcessive risk taking. We extend the Diamond and Rajan (2012) model of banks with the production factors and explore how a pecuniary externality a¤ects a banks leverage. We show that the laissez-faire banks in our model take on excessive risks compared with the constrained social optimum. Our numerical simulations suggest that the crisis probability is 2-3 percentage points higher in the laissez-faire economy than in the constrained social optimum.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1078
ページ	1-32
刊行年月	2020-03
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/75942
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1078.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, 1078, p. 1-32
DC.title	Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility
DC.creator	Kato, Ryo
DC.creator	Tsuruga, Takayuki
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-03
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1078.pdf
DC.subject	Financial crisis
	Liquidity shortage
	Maturity mismatch
	Credit externalities
	Financial regulation
DCTERMS.abstract	Pecuniary externalities in models with nancial friction justify macroprudential policies for preventing economic agentsexcessive risk taking. We extend the Diamond and Rajan (2012) model of banks with the production factors and explore how a pecuniary externality a¤ects a banks leverage. We show that the laissez-faire banks in our model take on excessive risks compared with the constrained social optimum. Our numerical simulations suggest that the crisis probability is 2-3 percentage points higher in the laissez-faire economy than in the constrained social optimum.
DC.format	75942
citation_title	Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility
citation_author	Kato, Ryo
citation_author	Tsuruga, Takayuki
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-03
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1078
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	32
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/75942
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1078.pdf

Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility

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