Learning While Setting Precedents

Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya

Learning While Setting Precedents

Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, 1092, 1-54

アクセス数:163件（2025-07-13 00:24 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/76687

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タイトル	Learning While Setting Precedents
著者	著者名 Chen, Ying
著者	著者名 Eraslan, Hülya
キーワード等	precedent
	binding precedent
	information acquisition
	transparency
抄録	A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to nonbinding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1092
ページ	1-54
刊行年月	2020-06
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/76687
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1092.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, 1092, p. 1-54
DC.title	Learning While Setting Precedents
DC.creator	Chen, Ying
DC.creator	Eraslan, Hülya
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-06
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1092.pdf
DC.subject	precedent
	binding precedent
	information acquisition
	transparency
DCTERMS.abstract	A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to nonbinding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on.
DC.format	76687
citation_title	Learning While Setting Precedents
citation_author	Chen, Ying
citation_author	Eraslan, Hülya
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-06
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1092
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	54
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/76687
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1092.pdf

Learning While Setting Precedents

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