Serial Vickrey mechanism

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Serial Vickrey mechanism

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, (1095), 1-53

アクセス数:404件（2025-07-12 22:16 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/76691

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タイトル	Serial Vickrey mechanism
著者	NRID 1000040807450 1000040807450 著者名 Zhou, Yu
著者	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	The assignment market
	minimum price equilibrium
	general preferences
	structural characterizations
	Serial Vickrey mechanism
	dynamic incentive compatibility
抄録	We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the ❝ Serial Vickrey mechanism,❞ that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	(1095)
ページ	1-53
刊行年月	2020-07
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/76691
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1095.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, (1095), p. 1-53
DC.title	Serial Vickrey mechanism
DC.creator	Zhou, Yu
DC.creator	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1095.pdf
DC.subject	The assignment market
	minimum price equilibrium
	general preferences
	structural characterizations
	Serial Vickrey mechanism
	dynamic incentive compatibility
DCTERMS.abstract	We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the ❝ Serial Vickrey mechanism,❞ that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.
DC.format	76691
citation_title	Serial Vickrey mechanism
citation_author	Zhou, Yu
citation_author	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-07
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_issue	1095
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	53
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/76691
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1095.pdf

Serial Vickrey mechanism

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