Serial Vickrey mechanism

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

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論文情報

タイトル	Serial Vickrey mechanism
著者	Zhou, Yu Zhou, Yu
著者	Serizawa, Shigehiro Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	The assignment market
	minimum price equilibrium
	general preferences
	structural characterizations
	Serial Vickrey mechanism
	dynamic incentive compatibility
抄録	We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the ❝ Serial Vickrey mechanism,❞ that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
号	1095
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	53
刊行年月	2020-07
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/76691
関連情報 (references)	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1095.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers(1095) P.1-P.53
DC.title	Serial Vickrey mechanism
DC.creator	Zhou, Yu
DC.creator	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-07
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/76691
DC.subject	The assignment market
	minimum price equilibrium
	general preferences
	structural characterizations
	Serial Vickrey mechanism
	dynamic incentive compatibility
DCTERMS.abstract	We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the ❝ Serial Vickrey mechanism,❞ that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.
citation_title	Serial Vickrey mechanism
citation_author	Zhou, Yu
citation_author	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-07
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_issue	1095
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	53
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/76691
citation_keywords	The assignment market
	minimum price equilibrium
	general preferences
	structural characterizations
	Serial Vickrey mechanism
	dynamic incentive compatibility

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