紀要論文

紀要論文

text

国際公共政策研究. 2020, 25(1), p. 47-61

大阪大学国際公共政策学会

日本語

text

2020-09

On November 25, 1969, United States President Richard Nixon issued National Security Decision Memorandum 35, which declared that the United States would renounce its offensive biological warfare programs and first use of chemical weapons. Why did the Nixon administration decide to unilaterally restrict chemical and biological weapons? Previous works have stressed the normative pressure and reputational costs of the Vietnam War. However, given the fact that biological weapons had not been used in the war, the difference in the treatment of chemicals and biologicals remains unclear. To address this problem, this article focuses on the role of nuclear weapons in the chemical and biological disarmament. For the Nixon administration, chemical weapons had utility in terms of complementing the nuclear deterrence as the “middle-level option.” Biological weapons offered options on the same strategic level as nuclear weapons and thus were regarded as redundant. The findings of this article suggest it is important to consider the linkage between policies on Weapons of Mass Destruction, which has not often been a subject of attention in disarmament literature.

10.18910/77125

77125

ニクソン政権期の生物・化学兵器軍縮にみる核抑止との連関

日高, 薫

大阪大学国際公共政策学会

日本語

2020-09

国際公共政策研究

25

1

47

61

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77125

10.18910/77125

https://doi.org/10.18910/77125