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2022-05-20
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このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください:
https://doi.org/10.18910/77126
このアイテムへのリンクには次のURLをご利用ください:http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77126
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論文情報
タイトル
The Supreme Leader’s Legitimacy Crises and Candidate Screening in Iran’s Post-Khomeini Parliamentary Elections
著者
Chisaka, Tomoyo
Chisaka, Tomoyo
キーワード等
Candidate screening
electoral politics
legitimacy
Iran
内容
投稿論文
Refereed Article
抄録
It is widely known that Iran’s Guardian Council, whose members are mostly appointed by the Supreme Leader, has disqualified reformist candidates to prevent them from entering into Parliament. However, few studies analyzed the timing when reformists were likely to be disqualified and whether the target of disqualification has been consistent over the years. Examining screening practices by the Guardian Council in parliamentary elections, this paper found that the targets of disqualification has gradually increased in the post-Khomeini period. It also found that the expansion of targets is closely associated with critical events or popular protests that challenge the Supreme Leader’s legitimacy. These findings have two theoretical implications. First, although these findings are in line with “informational effect of electoral control” suggested by the previous research as candidate screening can signal leadership’s power of holding state institutions to discourage opposition supporters and to retain regime supporters, this paper clarifies the timing when the leadership is much more likely to rely on the informational effect. Second, Iran’s candidate screening represents a rare case to analyze how the leadership performs under the condition in which excluding candidates is legalized, but criterion for judging credentials are rather vague and the leadership can flexibly change targets of disqualification.
公開者
大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科
公開者 (ヨミ)
オオサカ ダイガク ダイガクイン コクサイ コウキョウ セイサク ケンキュウカ
掲載誌名
国際公共政策研究
巻
25
号
1
開始ページ
63
終了ページ
77
刊行年月
2020-09
ISSN
24320870
NCID
AA1115271X
URL
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77126
言語
英語
DOI
info:doi/10.18910/77126
カテゴリ
紀要論文 Departmental Bulletin Paper
国際公共政策研究 / 25巻1号(2020-09)
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著者版フラグ
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text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation
国際公共政策研究.25(1) P.63-P.77
DC.title
The Supreme Leader’s Legitimacy Crises and Candidate Screening in Iran’s Post-Khomeini Parliamentary Elections
DC.creator
Chisaka, Tomoyo
DC.publisher
大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766
英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF
2020-09
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77126
DC.subject
Candidate screening
electoral politics
legitimacy
Iran
DC.description
投稿論文
Refereed Article
DCTERMS.abstract
It is widely known that Iran’s Guardian Council, whose members are mostly appointed by the Supreme Leader, has disqualified reformist candidates to prevent them from entering into Parliament. However, few studies analyzed the timing when reformists were likely to be disqualified and whether the target of disqualification has been consistent over the years. Examining screening practices by the Guardian Council in parliamentary elections, this paper found that the targets of disqualification has gradually increased in the post-Khomeini period. It also found that the expansion of targets is closely associated with critical events or popular protests that challenge the Supreme Leader’s legitimacy. These findings have two theoretical implications. First, although these findings are in line with “informational effect of electoral control” suggested by the previous research as candidate screening can signal leadership’s power of holding state institutions to discourage opposition supporters and to retain regime supporters, this paper clarifies the timing when the leadership is much more likely to rely on the informational effect. Second, Iran’s candidate screening represents a rare case to analyze how the leadership performs under the condition in which excluding candidates is legalized, but criterion for judging credentials are rather vague and the leadership can flexibly change targets of disqualification.
DC.identifier
info:doi/10.18910/77126
citation_title
The Supreme Leader’s Legitimacy Crises and Candidate Screening in Iran’s Post-Khomeini Parliamentary Elections
citation_author
Chisaka, Tomoyo
citation_publisher
大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科
citation_language
英語
citation_date
2020-09
citation_journal_title
国際公共政策研究
citation_volume
25
citation_issue
1
citation_firstpage
63
citation_lastpage
77
citation_issn
24320870
citation_public_url
http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77126
citation_keywords
Candidate screening
electoral politics
legitimacy
Iran
citation_doi
info:doi/10.18910/77126