Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, 1103, 1-49

アクセス数:415件（2025-07-03 17:20 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77256

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タイトル	Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences
著者	NRID 1000020768238 1000020768238 著者名 Chen, Chia-Hui
	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 ORCID 0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216 researchmap permalink read0116302 read0116302 Scopus Author ID 36927932200 36927932200 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
	著者名 Suen, Wing
キーワード等	single-crossing property
	double-crossing property
	counter-signaling
	pairwise pooling
	mass pooling
内容	October 2020. Revised December 2020
抄録	This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a particular form of pooling: there is a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they choose actions that are clustered in possibly non-monotonic ways, with a gap separating these two sets of types. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction under mild conditions.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1103
ページ	1-49
刊行年月	2020-12
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77256
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1103R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2020-12

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, 1103, p. 1-49
DC.title	Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences
DC.creator	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Suen, Wing
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-12
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1103R.pdf
DC.subject	single-crossing property
	double-crossing property
	counter-signaling
	pairwise pooling
	mass pooling
DC.description	October 2020. Revised December 2020
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a particular form of pooling: there is a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they choose actions that are clustered in possibly non-monotonic ways, with a gap separating these two sets of types. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction under mild conditions.
DC.format	77256
citation_title	Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences
citation_author	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Suen, Wing
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-12
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1103
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	49
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77256
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1103R.pdf

Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences

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