Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

このアイテムのアクセス数:2件（2020-10-25 20:27 集計）

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論文情報

タイトル	Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences
著者	Chen, Chia-Hui Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro Ishida, Junichiro
	Suen, Wing Suen, Wing
キーワード等	single-crossing property
	double-crossing property
	counter-signaling
	pairwise pooling
	mass pooling
抄録	This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a particular form of pooling: there is a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they choose actions that are clustered in possibly non-monotonic ways, with a gap separating these two sets of types. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction under mild conditions.
公開者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
掲載誌名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻	1103
開始ページ	1
終了ページ	48
刊行年月	2020-10
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77256
関連情報 (references)	http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1103.pdf
言語	英語
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP

著者版フラグ	none
NII資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
dcmi資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers.1103 P.1-P.48
DC.title	Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences
DC.creator	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Suen, Wing
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-10
DC.identifier" scheme="DCTERMS.URI	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77256
DC.subject	single-crossing property
	double-crossing property
	counter-signaling
	pairwise pooling
	mass pooling
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a particular form of pooling: there is a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they choose actions that are clustered in possibly non-monotonic ways, with a gap separating these two sets of types. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction under mild conditions.
citation_title	Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences
citation_author	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Suen, Wing
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-10
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1103
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	48
citation_public_url	http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77256
citation_keywords	single-crossing property
	double-crossing property
	counter-signaling
	pairwise pooling
	mass pooling

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