Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, 1107, 1-16

アクセス数:529件（2026-02-16 11:41 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77400

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タイトル	Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects
著者	著者名 Sakai, Ryosuke
著者	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	Multi-object allocation problem
	Strategy-proofness
	Ex-post revenue maximization
	Minimum price Walrasian rule
	Non-quasi-linear preference
	Equal treatment of equals
	Non-wastefulness
抄録	We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (2020B), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing rule among the rules satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1107
ページ	1-16
刊行年月	2020-10
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77400
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1107.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, 1107, p. 1-16
DC.title	Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects
DC.creator	Sakai, Ryosuke
DC.creator	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-10
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1107.pdf
DC.subject	Multi-object allocation problem
	Strategy-proofness
	Ex-post revenue maximization
	Minimum price Walrasian rule
	Non-quasi-linear preference
	Equal treatment of equals
	Non-wastefulness
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (2020B), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing rule among the rules satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.
DC.format	77400
citation_title	Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects
citation_author	Sakai, Ryosuke
citation_author	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-10
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1107
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	16
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77400
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1107.pdf

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

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