The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

Masuda, Takehito; Mikami, Ryo; Sakai, Toyotaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Wakayama, Takuma

The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

Masuda, Takehito; Mikami, Ryo; Sakai, Toyotaka et al.

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2020, 1109, 1-32

アクセス数:437件（2026-02-07 20:29 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77672

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タイトル	The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
著者	NRID 1000080725060 1000080725060 著者名 Masuda, Takehito
	著者名 Mikami, Ryo
	NRID 1000050404976 1000050404976 著者名 Sakai, Toyotaka
	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
	NRID 1000080448654 1000080448654 著者名 Wakayama, Takuma
キーワード等	advice effect
	strategy-proofness
	Vickrey auction
	pay-your-bid auction
	market design
抄録	We conducted laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice was 20%, whereas the rate increased to 47% among those who received advice. By conducting similar experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, we confirm that the increase in truth-telling owes significantly to the net advice effect, i.e., the effect beyond the so-called experimenter demand effect. Moreover, providing advice improves efficiency in the Vickrey auction, particularly in the early periods, when subjects are less experienced. It is well known that subjects tend to overbid in Vickrey auction experiments. Our results indicate the possibility that providing a piece of simple advice decreases such overbidding by promoting a better understanding of the strategy-proofness property in the Vickrey auction. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit in telling the truth; however, our observations show that introducing advice on the property of strategy-proofness helps them behave “correctly.”
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1109
ページ	1-32
刊行年月	2020-12
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77672
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1109.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2020, 1109, p. 1-32
DC.title	The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
DC.creator	Masuda, Takehito
	Mikami, Ryo
	Sakai, Toyotaka
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
	Wakayama, Takuma
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2020-12
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1109.pdf
DC.subject	advice effect
	strategy-proofness
	Vickrey auction
	pay-your-bid auction
	market design
DCTERMS.abstract	We conducted laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice was 20%, whereas the rate increased to 47% among those who received advice. By conducting similar experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, we confirm that the increase in truth-telling owes significantly to the net advice effect, i.e., the effect beyond the so-called experimenter demand effect. Moreover, providing advice improves efficiency in the Vickrey auction, particularly in the early periods, when subjects are less experienced. It is well known that subjects tend to overbid in Vickrey auction experiments. Our results indicate the possibility that providing a piece of simple advice decreases such overbidding by promoting a better understanding of the strategy-proofness property in the Vickrey auction. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit in telling the truth; however, our observations show that introducing advice on the property of strategy-proofness helps them behave “correctly.”
DC.format	77672
citation_title	The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
citation_author	Masuda, Takehito
	Mikami, Ryo
	Sakai, Toyotaka
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
	Wakayama, Takuma
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2020-12
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1109
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	32
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77672
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2020/DP1109.pdf

The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

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