Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity : Leading Examples

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2021, 1116, 1-21

アクセス数:512件（2026-04-05 07:45 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/78362

論文情報

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タイトル
Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity : Leading Examples
著者
NRID
1000040807450 1000040807450
著者名
Zhou, Yu
NRID
1000090252717 1000090252717
researchmap permalink
serizawa serizawa
Scopus Author ID
56234421600 56234421600
著者名
Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等
Multi-object auction
minimum price equilibrium
exam-ples
quasi-linear utility functions
general utility functions
抄録
In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents’ utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit ele-gant e¢ ciency and incentive-compatibility. These auctions are conjured to preserve their properties beyond quasi-linearity. Nevertheless, we exemplify that with general utility functions, these auctions fail to identify the MPEs and are substantially ine¢ cient and manipulatable. The implications of our negative results for multi-object auction models with agents with multi-unit demand, and matching with contracts models are also discussed.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1116
ページ
1-21
刊行年月
2021-01
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/78362
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2021/DP1116.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers