学術雑誌論文

学術雑誌論文

text

Spatial Economic Analysis. 2018, 13(3), p. 276-295

Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

Kato, Hayato

Taylor & Francis

英語

text

2018-02-09

https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2018.1425477

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Spatial Economic Analysis on 2018, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2018.1425477.

This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic industry with many firms. Each government sets its tax rate strategically to maximize the weighted sum of residents’ welfare and political contributions by owners of firms. It is shown that if the governments care deeply about contributions and trade costs are low, the small country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms by setting a lower tax rate. The well-known home-market effect, which states that countries with a larger market attract a more-than-proportionate share of firms, may be reversed as a result of tax competition by politically interested governments.

81777

Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

Kato, Hayato

Taylor & Francis

英語

2018-02-09

Spatial Economic Analysis

13

3

276

295

https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2018.1425477

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81777