Inequality aversion with general payoff function

Kawanaka, Daijiro

Inequality aversion with general payoff function

Kawanaka, Daijiro

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2021, 21-09, 1-6

アクセス数:319件（2025-09-22 05:11 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81853

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル	Inequality aversion with general payoff function
著者	著者名 Kawanaka, Daijiro
キーワード等	Inequality aversion under risk
	Maxmin expected utility
	Social preferences
抄録	In the existing axiomatic models of inequity aversion, players have linear payoff functions, so they can predict that a dictator chooses only a completely selfish or completely fair offer in dictator games. However, experimental literature documents that a significantly amount of dictators offers 20-30% of the total pie to the passive opponent. This note, in contrast, ax-iomatizes inequity averse representation with general payoff function, so that we can explain such interior choices.
出版者	Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
収録物名	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)	21-09
ページ	1-6
刊行年月	2021-06
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81853
NCID	AA1160366X
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2109.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2021, 21-09, p. 1-6
DC.title	Inequality aversion with general payoff function
DC.creator	Kawanaka, Daijiro
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2021-06
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2109.pdf
DC.subject	Inequality aversion under risk
	Maxmin expected utility
	Social preferences
DCTERMS.abstract	In the existing axiomatic models of inequity aversion, players have linear payoff functions, so they can predict that a dictator chooses only a completely selfish or completely fair offer in dictator games. However, experimental literature documents that a significantly amount of dictators offers 20-30% of the total pie to the passive opponent. This note, in contrast, ax-iomatizes inequity averse representation with general payoff function, so that we can explain such interior choices.
DC.format	81853
citation_title	Inequality aversion with general payoff function
citation_author	Kawanaka, Daijiro
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2021-06
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	21-09
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	6
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81853
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2109.pdf

Inequality aversion with general payoff function

論文情報

論文詳細を表示