Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes

Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2021, DP-2021-E-006, 1-38

アクセス数:350件（2025-08-26 02:07 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/85118

論文情報

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タイトル
Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes
著者
NRID
1000010796345 1000010796345
researchmap permalink
takeshimurooka takeshimurooka
Scopus Author ID
37079438400 37079438400
著者名
Murooka, Takeshi
著者名
Yamashita, Takuro
キーワード等
adverse selection
inferential naivety
mechanism design
behavioral contract theory
consumer protection
抄録
We study an adverse selection environment, where a rational seller can trade a good of which she privately knows its value to a buyer, and there are gains from trade. The buyer's types differ in their degree of inferential abilities: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from the seller's offer, whereas a naive type under-appreciates the correlation between the seller's private information and offer. We characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the social surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is (in particular, even when no trade is the unique possible outcome if all agents are rational), all types of buyers trade in the optimal mechanism. The rational buyer's trade occurs at the expense of the naive buyer's losses. We also investigate a consumer-protection policy of limiting the losses and discuss its implications.
出版者
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
収録物名
OSIPP Discussion Paper
巻(号)
DP-2021-E-006
ページ
1-38
刊行年月
2021-09
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/85118
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2021/DP2021E006.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper