Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players : First-Order Misspecification and Higher-Order Misspecification

Murooka, Takeshi; Yamamoto, Yuichi

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2021, DP-2021-E-008, 1-96

アクセス数:551件（2025-12-04 18:02 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/85475

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players : First-Order Misspecification and Higher-Order Misspecification
著者
NRID
1000010796345 1000010796345
researchmap permalink
takeshimurooka takeshimurooka
Scopus Author ID
37079438400 37079438400
著者名
Murooka, Takeshi
NRID
1000040855178 1000040855178
著者名
Yamamoto, Yuichi
キーワード等
model misspecification
learning
convergence
overconfidence
bias transmission
抄録
We consider strategic players who may have a misspecified view about the world, and investigate their long-run behavior when they learn an unknown state from public signals over time. Our framework is flexible and allows for higher-order misspecification, in that a player may have a bias about the physical environment, a bias about the opponent's bias about the physical environment, and so on. We provide a condition under which players' beliefs and actions converge to a steady state, and then characterize how one's misspecification influences the long-run (steady-state) outcome. We apply these results to various economic examples such as Cournot competition, team production, and discrimination. We find that higher-order misspecification can have a significant impact on the equilibrium outcome: One's overconfidence can have opposite effects on the equilibrium outcome, depending on whether the opponent is aware of this bias or not.
出版者
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
収録物名
OSIPP Discussion Paper
巻(号)
DP-2021-E-008
ページ
1-96
刊行年月
2021-12-02
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/85475
関連情報 (references)
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2021/DP2021E008.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper