Is Externalism Compatible with the Epistemic Privilege of Self-Knowledge?

シンテキ ナイヨウ ニカンスル ガイザイ シュギ ト ジコチ ノ ニンシキテキ トッケンセイ ハ リョウリツ スルカ

マエダ, タカヒロ

Maeda, Takahiro

オオサカ ダイガク ニンゲン カガクブ シャカイガク ニンゲンガク ジンルイガク ケンキュウシツ

英語

自己知

アプリオリ

反懐疑論

信念帰属

externalism

self-knowledge

a priori

anti-scepticism

belief-ascription

Is externalism about mental content compatible with the epistemically privileged character of self-knowledge? M y answer is that an orthodox form of externalism championed by Burge is not, contrary to Burge's claime, but that alternative forms of externalism can be. A typical way of showing incompatibility points out that, when externalism is combined with epistemic privilege of self-knowledge, facts about the external world become deducible a priori. But I argue that such an argument cannot definitely refute alleged Burgean compatibilism. The heart of the problem lies in an orthodox externalist's account of belief-ascription. Orthodox externalists, so long as they accept the epistemic privilege of self-knowledge, must ascribe irrational beliefs to agents illegitimately in many cases. And precisely for this reason, they cannot accept the epistemic privilege of self-knowledge. Externalism which rightly acknowledges the privileged character of self-knowledge places due importance to particular contexts within which action and thinking occur.

英語