The object of common notion in Spinoza’s Ethics : A conceptual-historical implication of Proportio

スピノザ 　エチカ　ニ　オケル　キョウツウ　ガイネン　ノ　タイショウ　Proportio　ノ　ガイネン　シテキ　ナ　ガンイ

ササキ, コウヤ

Sasaki, Koya

オオサカ ダイガク ダイガクイン ニンゲン カガク ケンキュウカ キョウセイガク ジャーナル ヘンシュウ イインカイ

共通概念

プロポーション

Spinoza

common notion

proportion

Spinoza acknowledges that his philosophy is “true philosophy”. This self-pride stands on the “common notion” which is the “foundation of philosophy” for him. In this paper, I will focus on the problem of the object of common notion. The object has been interpreted in a variety of extrinsic contexts (biological, political, etc.). In this paper, I present one interpretation that from the conceptual-historical perspective, while keeping in mind the trajectory of thought from Spinoza’s early texts. I finally argue for the need to shed light on the term “proportio” or Spinoza’s concept of proportion, which has tended to be neglected in previous Spinoza studies, and propose the understanding of that the knowledge of the second kind as “geometry of the situation”.