紀要論文

紀要論文

text

大阪大学大学院人間科学研究科紀要. 2022, 48, p. 67-88

日本語

text

2022-03-18

This article is the second (Part II) of a series of six to eight parts. Alloying philosophy, psychoanalysis, and cultural studies, this series seeks to articulate a relationship between the essential nature of Western philosophy’s metaphysical method of dialectics and the structure of memory in human beings. Covering Western philosophers from ancient to modern, such as Plato, Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Hegel, Lacan, Derrida, and Jakobson, and quoting social, cultural, and psychopathological materials such as Sarashina Diary (the daughter of Sugawara no Takasue in 11c Japan), Funes the Memorious (Jorge Luis Borges), Norwegian Wood (Haruki Murakami), 1984(Apple Computer television commercial), autism spectrum disorder, late capitalism, and even the Quest Atlantis boom, this series endeavors to elucidate the nature of memory in the neurotypical (NT), i.e., the so-called normal, the majority of human beings. It is only in comparison with the so-called abnormal that the so-called normal can be defined. As a conclusion, the author elucidates that it is the being of ‘the otherness’ which always and already permeates the normal and stable working of memory, and it is that which frames the structure and content of the ego. In other words, the heteronomous nature of the capability of memory and imagination of typical developed individuals will be depicted. In Part I, I discussed the positions of memory and imagination from Augustine to Descartes, and in this Part II, I proceed to Kant and Heidegger. I discuss the difference between Kant’s and Hegel’s theories of imagination via the perspective of Foucault’s critique of philosophical anthropology and then closely examine Heidegger’s “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics” to discuss the relationship between imagination and time. The shortcoming of Heidegger’s theory of imagination is that it is trapped in a sort of circular logic by saying that the source of time is imagination and, at the same time, that the source of imagination is temporality. The result is that Heidegger does not reach a primordial dimension of imagination before the “self” as giving rise to temporality but only achieves a secular form of temporality as a triune structure of past, present, and future. Heidegger took from Kant that the establishment of the ego and the establishment of temporality are the same, but he could not analyze the structure of why this is so. In the next part (part III), the establishment of the “I” as a dialectical structure, a structure of the identity of difference and identity, is to be clarified by discussing the semiotics of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Spirit.” (To be continued.)

10.18910/86862

86862

構想力と人間 : 記憶と想像力の政治経済学批判序説〈２〉

野尻, 英一

大阪大学大学院人間科学研究科

日本語

2022-03-18

大阪大学大学院人間科学研究科紀要

48

67

88

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/86862

10.18910/86862

https://doi.org/10.18910/86862