The Countervailing Power Hypothesis and Contingent Contracts

Matsushima, Noriaki; Yoshida, Shohei

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2022, 1191, 1-14

アクセス数:402件（2025-09-30 09:07 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89376

論文情報

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タイトル
The Countervailing Power Hypothesis and Contingent Contracts
著者
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
著者名
Yoshida, Shohei
キーワード等
Countervailing power
Buyer power
Dominant retailer
Two-part tariff
Contingent contract
抄録
We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We examine how contract type influences the relationship between the dominant retailer’s bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the contracts between the supplier and fringe retailers are contingent on the bargaining outcome between the supplier and the dominant retailer, the bargaining power does not affect the retail price. In contrast, if contracts with fringe retailers are not contingent, the relationship between bargaining power and retail price can be either positive or negative.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1191
ページ
1-14
刊行年月
2022-10
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89376
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2022/DP1191.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers