The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

Daido, Kohei; Murooka, Takeshi

The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

Daido, Kohei; Murooka, Takeshi

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2022, DP-2022-E-005, 1-29

アクセス数:390件（2025-08-26 02:08 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89687

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タイトル	The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking
著者	NRID 1000070388354 1000070388354 著者名 Daido, Kohei
著者	NRID 1000010796345 1000010796345 researchmap permalink takeshimurooka takeshimurooka Scopus Author ID 37079438400 37079438400 著者名 Murooka, Takeshi
キーワード等	Multitasking
	Signaling
	Leadership
	Pay for Performance
	Help
	Overwork
抄録	We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers who can also contribute to this task. We highlight a new mechanism by incorporating leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998) in a multi-tasking model. To prevent excessive effort by the agent with low value on the non-contractible task, the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task. We discuss its organizational implications to pay for performance, incentives to help colleagues, and prevention of overwork.
出版者	Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
収録物名	OSIPP Discussion Paper
巻(号)	DP-2022-E-005
ページ	1-29
刊行年月	2022-11-25
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89687
関連情報 (references)	URI http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2022/DP2022E005.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	OSIPP Discussion Paper

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	OSIPP Discussion Paper. 2022, DP-2022-E-005, p. 1-29
DC.title	The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking
DC.creator	Daido, Kohei
DC.creator	Murooka, Takeshi
DC.publisher	Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2022-11-25
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2022/DP2022E005.pdf
DC.subject	Multitasking
	Signaling
	Leadership
	Pay for Performance
	Help
	Overwork
DCTERMS.abstract	We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers who can also contribute to this task. We highlight a new mechanism by incorporating leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998) in a multi-tasking model. To prevent excessive effort by the agent with low value on the non-contractible task, the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task. We discuss its organizational implications to pay for performance, incentives to help colleagues, and prevention of overwork.
DC.format	89687
citation_title	The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking
citation_author	Daido, Kohei
citation_author	Murooka, Takeshi
citation_publisher	Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2022-11-25
citation_journal_title	OSIPP Discussion Paper
citation_volume	DP-2022-E-005
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	29
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89687
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2022/DP2022E005.pdf

The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

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