Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems

Chen, Chia-Hui; Chen, Kong-Pin; Ishida, Junichiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2023, 1203, 1-41

アクセス数:215件（2025-07-06 09:31 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/91207

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems
著者
NRID
1000020768238 1000020768238
著者名
Chen, Chia-Hui
著者名
Chen, Kong-Pin
NRID
1000040324222 1000040324222
著者名
Ishida, Junichiro
キーワード等
online platform
rating system
anonymity
preference diversity
price fluctuation
dynamic adverse selection
抄録
Despite widespread use in online transactions, rating systems only provide summary statistics of buyers’ diverse opinions at best. To investigate the consequences of this coarse form of information aggregation, we consider a dynamic lemons market in which buyers share their evaluations anonymously through a rating system. When the buyers have diverse preferences, the value of a good rating depends endogenously on the seller’s pricing strategy, which in turn creates complicated dynamic interactions and results in stochastic price fluctuations. Occasional flash sales induced by the rating system yield a non-trivial welfare effect that stands in sharp contrast to standard adverse selection models: all buyers are weakly better off with information asymmetry than without. Incentivizing buyers to leave ratings may backfire by exacerbating the seller’s strategic pricing incentives.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1203
ページ
1-41
刊行年月
2023-03
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/91207
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2023/DP1203.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers