An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; Yamada, Takashi

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010

An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric et al.

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 141, 88-104

アクセス数:398件（2025-11-03 22:49 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92343

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タイトル	An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
著者	著者名 Chessa, Michela
	NRID 1000070400611 1000070400611 ORCID 0000-0003-3127-690X 0000-0003-3127-690X researchmap permalink nhanaki nhanaki Scopus Author ID 16233221700 16233221700 著者名 Hanaki, Nobuyuki
	著者名 Lardon, Aymeric
	NRID 1000090401570 1000090401570 著者名 Yamada, Takashi
キーワード等	Bargaining procedures
	Experiments
	Nash program
	Shapley value
内容	Chessa M., Hanaki N., Lardon A., et al. An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior 141, 88 (2023); https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010.
抄録	We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
出版者	Elsevier
収録物名	Games and Economic Behavior
巻(号)	141
ページ	88-104
刊行年月	2023-06-20
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92343
PISSN	08998256
eISSN	10902473
NCID	AA11537077
関連情報 (isVersionOf)	DOI (出版社版) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010
アクセス権	open access
権利情報	© 2023. This manuscript version is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
出版タイプ	Accepted Manuscript
カテゴリ	学術雑誌論文 Journal Article

資源タイプ	学術雑誌論文
ローカル資源タイプ	学術雑誌論文
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Games and Economic Behavior. 2023, 141, p. 88-104
DC.title	An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
DC.creator	Chessa, Michela
	Hanaki, Nobuyuki
	Lardon, Aymeric
	Yamada, Takashi
DC.publisher	Elsevier
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2023-06-20
DC.identifier	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010
DC.subject	Bargaining procedures
	Experiments
	Nash program
	Shapley value
DC.description	Chessa M., Hanaki N., Lardon A., et al. An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior 141, 88 (2023); https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010.
DCTERMS.abstract	We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
DC.rights	© 2023. This manuscript version is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
DC.format	92343
citation_title	An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
citation_author	Chessa, Michela
	Hanaki, Nobuyuki
	Lardon, Aymeric
	Yamada, Takashi
citation_publisher	Elsevier
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2023-06-20
citation_journal_title	Games and Economic Behavior
citation_volume	141
citation_firstpage	88
citation_lastpage	104
citation_doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92343

An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

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