The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms

Arai, Yasuhiro; Matsushima, Noriaki

doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638

The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms

Arai, Yasuhiro; Matsushima, Noriaki

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2023, 56(1), 114-132

アクセス数:246件（2025-08-15 17:31 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92429

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タイトル	The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms
著者	NRID 1000020611213 1000020611213 著者名 Arai, Yasuhiro
著者	NRID 1000080334879 1000080334879 ORCID 0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875 researchmap permalink read0116301 read0116301 Scopus Author ID 7005645778 7005645778 著者名 Matsushima, Noriaki
キーワード等	Mutual outsourcing
	Supplier
	Delegation
	Asymmetric managerial forms
内容	This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Arai Y., Matsushima N.. The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms. Canadian Journal of Economics 56, 114 (2023), which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
抄録	We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.
出版者	John Wiley and Sons Inc
収録物名	Canadian Journal of Economics
巻(号)	56(1)
ページ	114-132
刊行年月	2023-01-24
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92429
PISSN	00084085
eISSN	15405982
NCID	AA11618419
関連情報 (isVersionOf)	DOI (出版社版) https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638
アクセス権	open access
権利情報	© 2023 Canadian Economics Association.
出版タイプ	Accepted Manuscript
カテゴリ	学術雑誌論文 Journal Article

資源タイプ	学術雑誌論文
ローカル資源タイプ	学術雑誌論文
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Canadian Journal of Economics. 2023, 56(1), p. 114-132
DC.title	The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms
DC.creator	Arai, Yasuhiro
DC.creator	Matsushima, Noriaki
DC.publisher	John Wiley and Sons Inc
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2023-01-24
DC.identifier	https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638
DC.subject	Mutual outsourcing
	Supplier
	Delegation
	Asymmetric managerial forms
DC.description	This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Arai Y., Matsushima N.. The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms. Canadian Journal of Economics 56, 114 (2023), which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.
DC.rights	© 2023 Canadian Economics Association.
DC.format	92429
citation_title	The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms
citation_author	Arai, Yasuhiro
citation_author	Matsushima, Noriaki
citation_publisher	John Wiley and Sons Inc
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2023-01-24
citation_journal_title	Canadian Journal of Economics
citation_volume	56
citation_issue	1
citation_firstpage	114
citation_lastpage	132
citation_doi	https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92429

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