An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game

Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Takahashi, Yuta

An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game

Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Takahashi, Yuta

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2023, 1213, 1-39

アクセス数:511件（2026-07-17 02:18 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92688

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タイトル	An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game
著者	NRID 1000070400611 1000070400611 ORCID 0000-0003-3127-690X 0000-0003-3127-690X researchmap permalink nhanaki nhanaki Scopus Author ID 16233221700 16233221700 著者名 Hanaki, Nobuyuki
著者	NRID 1000010835747 1000010835747 著者名 Takahashi, Yuta
キーワード等	Expectation formation
キーワード等	Learning-to-forecast experiment
抄録	We present and conduct a novel experiment on a dynamic beauty contest game motivated by the canonical New-Keynesian model. Participants continuously provide forecasts for prices spanning multiple future periods. These forecasts determine the price for the current period and participants’ payoffs. Our findings are threefold. First, the observed prices in the experiment deviate more from the rational expectations equilibrium prices under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitution. Second, participants’ expectations respond to announcements of future shocks on average. Finally, participants employ heuristics in their forecasting; however, the choice of heuristic varies with the degree of strategic complementarity.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1213
ページ	1-39
刊行年月	2023-09
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92688
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2023/DP1213.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2023, 1213, p. 1-39
DC.title	An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game
DC.creator	Hanaki, Nobuyuki
DC.creator	Takahashi, Yuta
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2023-09
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2023/DP1213.pdf
DC.subject	Expectation formation
DC.subject	Learning-to-forecast experiment
DCTERMS.abstract	We present and conduct a novel experiment on a dynamic beauty contest game motivated by the canonical New-Keynesian model. Participants continuously provide forecasts for prices spanning multiple future periods. These forecasts determine the price for the current period and participants’ payoffs. Our findings are threefold. First, the observed prices in the experiment deviate more from the rational expectations equilibrium prices under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitution. Second, participants’ expectations respond to announcements of future shocks on average. Finally, participants employ heuristics in their forecasting; however, the choice of heuristic varies with the degree of strategic complementarity.
DC.format	92688
citation_title	An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game
citation_author	Hanaki, Nobuyuki
citation_author	Takahashi, Yuta
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2023-09
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1213
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	39
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92688
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2023/DP1213.pdf

An Experiment on a Dynamic Beauty Contest Game

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