学術雑誌論文

学術雑誌論文

text

Review of Industrial Organization. 2023, 64, p. 219-242

How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

Springer

英語

text

2023-11-30

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09932-y

The version of record of this article, first published in Review of Industrial Organization, is available online at Publisher’s website: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09932-y

We develop a bilateral monopoly model with a downstream entrant to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent the upstream supplier from selling inputs to the downstream entrant. When the entrant is more efficient and needs a lesser amount of the input that is produced by the supplier than does the incumbent, the input demand may not increase significantly following the entry. Therefore, the socially efficient entry does not increase the supplier’s profits significantly, which allows the downstream incumbent to deter socially efficient entry through an exclusive supply contract. This result holds even in the simplest framework, which is composed of a single seller, buyer, and entrant.

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

93395

How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

Springer

英語

2023-11-30

Review of Industrial Organization

64

219

242

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09932-y

https://hdl.handle.net/11094/93395