Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation

Chen, Chia-Hui; Eraslan, Hülya; Ishida, Junichiro; Yamashita, Takuro

Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation

Chen, Chia-Hui; Eraslan, Hülya; Ishida, Junichiro et al.

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2024, 1247, 1-38

アクセス数:236件（2025-07-02 15:58 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/97108

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タイトル	Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation
著者	NRID 1000020768238 1000020768238 著者名 Chen, Chia-Hui
	researchmap permalink eraslan eraslan Scopus Author ID 6507509647 6507509647 著者名 Eraslan, Hülya
	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
	NRID 1000050928728 1000050928728 researchmap permalink takuroyamashita takuroyamashita 著者名 Yamashita, Takuro
キーワード等	strategic experimentation
	information design
	free-rider problem
	social learning
	COVID-19 pandemic
JEL分類コード (JEL)	D82
JEL分類コード (JEL)	D83
抄録	We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other agents’ experiences poses a significant obstacle to social learning. We show that the optimal feedback mechanism to mitigate information free-riding takes a strikingly simple form: the principal recommends adoption as long as she observes no bad news, but only with some probability; once she does not recommend at some point, she stays silent forever after that. Our analysis suggests the optimality of premature termination, which in turn implies that: (i) false positives (termination in the good state) are more acceptable than false negatives (continuation in the bad state); (ii) overly cautious mechanisms that are biased toward termination can be welfare-enhancing.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1247
ページ	1-38
刊行年月	2024-07
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/97108
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1247.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2024, 1247, p. 1-38
DC.title	Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation
DC.creator	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Eraslan, Hülya
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Yamashita, Takuro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2024-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1247.pdf
DC.subject	strategic experimentation
	information design
	free-rider problem
	social learning
	COVID-19 pandemic
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other agents’ experiences poses a significant obstacle to social learning. We show that the optimal feedback mechanism to mitigate information free-riding takes a strikingly simple form: the principal recommends adoption as long as she observes no bad news, but only with some probability; once she does not recommend at some point, she stays silent forever after that. Our analysis suggests the optimality of premature termination, which in turn implies that: (i) false positives (termination in the good state) are more acceptable than false negatives (continuation in the bad state); (ii) overly cautious mechanisms that are biased toward termination can be welfare-enhancing.
DC.format	97108
citation_title	Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation
citation_author	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Eraslan, Hülya
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Yamashita, Takuro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2024-07
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1247
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	38
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/97108
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1247.pdf

Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation

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