Optimal Dynamic Pricing under Network Externalities

Hirano, Seiya

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2024, 1267, 1-28

アクセス数:24件（2025-08-15 07:33 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/98536

論文情報

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タイトル
Optimal Dynamic Pricing under Network Externalities
著者
著者名
Hirano, Seiya
キーワード等
Network Externalities
Dynamic Pricing
Coordination Game
抄録
This paper studies the relationship between optimal dynamic pricing for network goods and the coor-dination of consumers’ adoption decisions. We show that based on risk dominance criterion, consumers face the risk of coordination failure, and introductory pricing is optimal if the risk is higher in period 1 without network. We find that under threshold coordination, the impact of price on the network size varies according to consumer beliefs. In pessimistic (optimistic) threshold coordination, the network size expands (shrinks) as the price increases. Lowering (Raising) the price in period 2 implies a smaller network size, so introductory (skim) pricing is optimal.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1267
ページ
1-28
刊行年月
2024-11
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/98536
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1267.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers