Signaling Vision : Knowing When to Quit

Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

Signaling Vision : Knowing When to Quit

Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2024, 1270, 1-36

アクセス数:334件（2025-11-04 13:31 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/98904

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タイトル	Signaling Vision : Knowing When to Quit
著者	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 ORCID 0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216 researchmap permalink read0116302 read0116302 Scopus Author ID 36927932200 36927932200 著者名 Ishida, Junichiro
著者	著者名 Suen, Wing
キーワード等	perseverance
	behavioral diversity
	mimicking
	non-monotone reputation dynamics
	bandit experimentation
JEL分類コード (JEL)	D82
JEL分類コード (JEL)	O31
抄録	We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. This creates opportunities for low types who do not observe any news to mimic high types by quitting strategically. In equilibrium, there is a mimicking phase of time when low types quit continuously. The reputation dynamics may exhibit non-monotonicity, with agents who quit either very early or very late carrying a higher reputation than do agents who quit near the optimal time for low types. Our analysis offers a unifying explanation for how and when both early and late quitting can enhance reputation and suggests novel welfare and policy implications.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1270
ページ	1-36
刊行年月	2024-12
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/98904
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1270.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2024, 1270, p. 1-36
DC.title	Signaling Vision : Knowing When to Quit
DC.creator	Ishida, Junichiro
DC.creator	Suen, Wing
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2024-12
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1270.pdf
DC.subject	perseverance
	behavioral diversity
	mimicking
	non-monotone reputation dynamics
	bandit experimentation
DCTERMS.abstract	We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. This creates opportunities for low types who do not observe any news to mimic high types by quitting strategically. In equilibrium, there is a mimicking phase of time when low types quit continuously. The reputation dynamics may exhibit non-monotonicity, with agents who quit either very early or very late carrying a higher reputation than do agents who quit near the optimal time for low types. Our analysis offers a unifying explanation for how and when both early and late quitting can enhance reputation and suggests novel welfare and policy implications.
DC.format	98904
citation_title	Signaling Vision : Knowing When to Quit
citation_author	Ishida, Junichiro
citation_author	Suen, Wing
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2024-12
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1270
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	36
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/98904
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2024/DP1270.pdf

Signaling Vision : Knowing When to Quit

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