Political Economy of Non-Compliance with the Golden Rule of Public Finance

Uchida, Yuki; Ono, Tetsuo

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2025, 25-01, 1-48

アクセス数:443件（2026-02-15 22:22 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/99972

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Political Economy of Non-Compliance with the Golden Rule of Public Finance
著者
著者名
Uchida, Yuki
NRID
1000050305661 1000050305661
ORCID
0000-0002-9838-828X 0000-0002-9838-828X
researchmap permalink
tono tono
Scopus Author ID
7403947415 7403947415
著者名
Ono, Tetsuo
キーワード等
Fiscal Rule
Golden Rule of Public Finance
Probabilistic Voting
Overlapping Generations
Political Distortions
JEL分類コード (JEL)
D70
E62
H63
抄録
This study examines the limitations of political equilibrium in fiscal policy formation by short-sighted governments that represent only the currently living generations, as compared to an allocation determined by a long-lived planner who values both current and future generations. Using an overlapping-generations model calibrated to Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, we evaluate the role of the Golden Rule of Public Finance (GR), which restricts deficit financing to public investment. The findings reveal that (i) reduced GR compliance shifts fiscal burdens from middle-aged voters to future generations and older adults, resulting in spillover effects; (ii) GR compliance is significantly influenced by the elasticity of public capital to investment, preferences for public goods, and GDP growth rates; and (iii) non-compliance with the GR causes political equilibrium to diverge from the planner’s optimal allocation.
出版者
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
収録物名
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
巻(号)
25-01
ページ
1-48
刊行年月
2025-01
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/99972
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2501.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Discussion Papers In Economics And Business