Considering "Concept Pragmatism"

ガイネン プラグマティズム ヲ メグッテ

イケヨシ, タクマ

Ikeyoshi, Takuma

オオサカ ダイガク ダイガクイン ニンゲン カガク ケンキュウカ シャカイガク ニンゲンガク ジンルイガク ケンキュウシツ

Sociology, Anthropology and Philosophy, Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University

概念プラグマティズム

概念所有

認知

志向性

Jerry Fodor

Concept Pragmatism

concept possession

epistemic foundation

intentionality

In 2004, J. Fodor insisted that a characteristic doctrine of twentieth century philosophy of mind/language was absolutely false. He called the doctrine “Concept Pragmatism,” according to which to have the concept C is to be able to distinguish Cs from non-Cs and/or to recognize the validity of certain C-involving inferences. In this paper, I examine the validity of his argument and make clear the epistemic foundation of Concept Pragmatism. In the first half of the paper, I explain an outline of Concept Pragmatism (section 2) and Fodor’s criticism of it (section 3). According to him, Concept Pragmatism implies that epistemic states are prior to concept possession, both in the ontological order and in the order of explanation. In the latter half of the paper, I examine two conditions which Concept Pragmatism requires to possess a concept. And I argue that these conditions depend on certain epistemic foundation and that Fodor’s criticism is not valid to some points (section 4).