An analytical study on decision-making of accounting enforcement

カイケイ　エンフォースメント　キカン　ノ　イシ　ケッテイ　ニ　カンスル　リロン　ケンキュウ

クロサワ, シュンスケ

Kurosawa, Shunsuke

The Economic Society of Osaka University and Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

監査

Accounting Enforcement

Audit

Article

This study conducts a game-theoretic analysis of decision making on accounting enforcement intensity and audit quality using a model that includes accounting enforcement monitoring costs and the audit costs. Consequently, I obtained two main results. First， when the audit costs increase， the accounting enforcement reduces the penalty amount for auditors while increasing the intensity of the monitoring. Second， as the monitoring costs of accounting enforcement increases， the auditor also increases audit quality. This study contributes to the analysis of the decision-making mechanism of the accounting enforcement and auditor.