Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments

Mitani, Yohei; Hanaki, Nobuyuki

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2025, 1273, 1-40

Number of Access:315（2025-09-07 12:27 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100199

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Title
Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments
Creator
NRID
1000070647172 1000070647172
CreatorName
Mitani, Yohei
NRID
1000070400611 1000070400611
ORCID
0000-0003-3127-690X 0000-0003-3127-690X
researchmap permalink
nhanaki nhanaki
Scopus Author ID
16233221700 16233221700
CreatorName
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Subject
Between-subject random incentive
Donation-dictator game
Social preferences
JEL
C91
D90
Abstract
We conduct an online donation dictator game experiment with over 1,300 participants, representative of the Japanese population, to investigate the relationship between the incentive scheme and prosocial behavior by systematically varying the stake size and probability of being paid, including those where the expected payments are controlled. We find that stake size is the main driver of donation decisions, even in the hypothetical scenario. Our result suggests that paying a large amount to a few participants incentivizes donation decisions better than paying a small amount to many in large-scale online experiments.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
1273
Page
1-40
Date of Issued
2025-02
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100199
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1273.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers