Better the Devil You Know : Managers’ Networks, Hiring Decisions and Team Performance

Clochard, Gwen-Jirō; Gomez-Gonzalez, Carlos; Henriques Pereira, Marco

Better the Devil You Know : Managers’ Networks, Hiring Decisions and Team Performance

Clochard, Gwen-Jirō; Gomez-Gonzalez, Carlos; Henriques Pereira, Marco

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2025, 1275, 1-37

Number of Access:138（2025-08-14 21:06 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100337

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Title	Better the Devil You Know : Managers’ Networks, Hiring Decisions and Team Performance
Creator	researchmap permalink gwen-jiro_clochard gwen-jiro_clochard CreatorName Clochard, Gwen-Jirō
	CreatorName Gomez-Gonzalez, Carlos
	CreatorName Henriques Pereira, Marco
Subject	managers
	network
	hiring
	performance
	football
JEL	L14
	J53
	M51
Abstract	Acquiring skilled workers can be a key comparative advantage for firms. However, this process involves much uncertainty that firms need to navigate. Leveraging managers’ social networks can help reduce search frictions, improve match quality, and boost firm performance. In this paper, we investigate the role of managers’ networks on three dimensions of individual and organizational outcomes: hiring, responsibilities, and performance. We do so by leveraging the availability of rich transactional data in professional football (soccer) in Europe. Our data covers both men’s and women’s football, comprising over 6k coaches, 80k players, and 100k movements between teams. First, we find that managers rely heavily on their networks for hiring decisions, particularly for non-star workers, and network-based recruiting can be done more cheaply than external hiring. Second, managers give their network-hired workers more responsibilities by allowing them more game time, particularly in the first season. Third, we find that increasing the number of network-recruited workers is associated with significantly higher team performance. These patterns hold consistently across both men’s and women’s football. We discuss the generalizability of our results and implications for managers in other industries.
Publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)	1275
Page	1-37
Date of Issued	2025-02
Language	English
Handle URL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100337
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
Relation.references	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1275.pdf
Access Rights	metadata only access
Category	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Category	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

Resource Type	technical report
Local Type	DP/WP
DCMI Type	Text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2025, 1275, p. 1-37
DC.title	Better the Devil You Know : Managers’ Networks, Hiring Decisions and Team Performance
DC.creator	Clochard, Gwen-Jirō
	Gomez-Gonzalez, Carlos
	Henriques Pereira, Marco
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	English
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	Text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2025-02
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1275.pdf
DC.subject	managers
	network
	hiring
	performance
	football
DCTERMS.abstract	Acquiring skilled workers can be a key comparative advantage for firms. However, this process involves much uncertainty that firms need to navigate. Leveraging managers’ social networks can help reduce search frictions, improve match quality, and boost firm performance. In this paper, we investigate the role of managers’ networks on three dimensions of individual and organizational outcomes: hiring, responsibilities, and performance. We do so by leveraging the availability of rich transactional data in professional football (soccer) in Europe. Our data covers both men’s and women’s football, comprising over 6k coaches, 80k players, and 100k movements between teams. First, we find that managers rely heavily on their networks for hiring decisions, particularly for non-star workers, and network-based recruiting can be done more cheaply than external hiring. Second, managers give their network-hired workers more responsibilities by allowing them more game time, particularly in the first season. Third, we find that increasing the number of network-recruited workers is associated with significantly higher team performance. These patterns hold consistently across both men’s and women’s football. We discuss the generalizability of our results and implications for managers in other industries.
DC.format	100337
citation_title	Better the Devil You Know : Managers’ Networks, Hiring Decisions and Team Performance
citation_author	Clochard, Gwen-Jirō
	Gomez-Gonzalez, Carlos
	Henriques Pereira, Marco
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	English
citation_date	2025-02
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1275
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	37
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100337
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1275.pdf

Better the Devil You Know : Managers’ Networks, Hiring Decisions and Team Performance

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