Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public Goods

Nishimura, Yukihiro

Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public Goods

Nishimura, Yukihiro

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2025, 25-04-Rev.2, 1-17

Number of Access:64（2025-08-15 22:51 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102072

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Title	Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public Goods
Creator	NRID 1000090345471 1000090345471 researchmap permalink read0156474 read0156474 Scopus Author ID 7403347968 7403347968 CreatorName Nishimura, Yukihiro
Subject	Global externalities
	Kantian equilibrium
	Income inequality
	International emissions trading
JEL	H41
	D63
	Q54
Description	Revised： [25-04-Rev., 2025]
Abstract	This paper develops a Kantian equilibrium framework that extends the global pollution model with private ownership, where agents condition their contributions on a universalizable moral imperative reflecting both income and preference heterogeneity. For both the Lindahl outcome and other proposed mechanisms, we identify specific proportionality conditions under which Kantian reasoning replicates these solutions as equilibrium behavior. We further show that the provision of public good does not necessarily increase with income inequality, and that some solutions exhibit invariance to inequality. Finally, we demonstrate that tradable permits may fail to achieve sufficient international redistribution to Southern countries to generate Pareto improvements over the voluntary contribution (disagreement) equilibrium. Grandfathering involves a form of proportionality between income and permit endowments, we show that this structure is better motivated by altruism. Our analysis contributes to a reinterpretation of morally grounded mechanisms for global public good provision, bridging normative ethics with economic design.
Publisher	Graduate School of Economics, The University of Osaka
Source Title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
Volume (Issue)	25-04-Rev.2
Page	1-17
Date of Issued	2025-07
Language	English
Handle URL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102072
Relation.references	URI https://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2504R2.pdf
Access Rights	metadata only access
Category	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Category	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

Resource Type	technical report
Local Type	DP/WP
DCMI Type	Text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2025, 25-04-Rev.2, p. 1-17
DC.title	Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public Goods
DC.creator	Nishimura, Yukihiro
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics, The University of Osaka
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	English
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	Text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2025-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2504R2.pdf
DC.subject	Global externalities
	Kantian equilibrium
	Income inequality
	International emissions trading
DC.description	Revised： [25-04-Rev., 2025]
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper develops a Kantian equilibrium framework that extends the global pollution model with private ownership, where agents condition their contributions on a universalizable moral imperative reflecting both income and preference heterogeneity. For both the Lindahl outcome and other proposed mechanisms, we identify specific proportionality conditions under which Kantian reasoning replicates these solutions as equilibrium behavior. We further show that the provision of public good does not necessarily increase with income inequality, and that some solutions exhibit invariance to inequality. Finally, we demonstrate that tradable permits may fail to achieve sufficient international redistribution to Southern countries to generate Pareto improvements over the voluntary contribution (disagreement) equilibrium. Grandfathering involves a form of proportionality between income and permit endowments, we show that this structure is better motivated by altruism. Our analysis contributes to a reinterpretation of morally grounded mechanisms for global public good provision, bridging normative ethics with economic design.
DC.format	102072
citation_title	Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public Goods
citation_author	Nishimura, Yukihiro
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics, The University of Osaka
citation_language	English
citation_date	2025-07
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	25-04-Rev.2
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	17
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102072
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/econ_society/dp/2504R2.pdf

Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public Goods

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