Can More Information Facilitate Communication?

Ishida, Junichiro; Shimizu, Takashi

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2012, 839

Number of Access:538（2025-11-04 13:16 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23397

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Title
Can More Information Facilitate Communication?
Creator
NRID
1000040324222 1000040324222
ORCID
0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216
researchmap permalink
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Scopus Author ID
36927932200 36927932200
CreatorName
Ishida, Junichiro
NRID
1000040119102 1000040119102
CreatorName
Shimizu, Takashi
Subject
Cheap talk
Informed receiver
Abstract
In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver’s prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus on the “dual role” of the sender’s message in this context: when the receiver has imperfect private information of her own, the sender’s message provides information about the true state as well as about the reliability of the receiver’s private information. This feature gives rise to the asymmetric response of the receiver’s action, where the receiver reacts less to the truthful message and more to the misrepresented one, which is essential in disciplining the sender to be more truthful.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
839
Date of Issued
2012-04
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23397
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0839.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers