Environmental Regulation and Technology Transfers

Asano, Takao; Matsushima, Noriaki

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2012, 862

Number of Access:273（2025-07-24 04:34 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23402

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Title
Environmental Regulation and Technology Transfers
Creator
NRID
1000040423157 1000040423157
CreatorName
Asano, Takao
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
Subject
Environmental regulation
Technology transfer
International competition
Duopoly
Abstract
This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm’s production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology support the Porter hypothesis, which states that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
862
Date of Issued
2012-12
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23402
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0862.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers