Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments

Ishida, Junichiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2012, 838

Number of Access:493（2025-11-04 13:16 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23406

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Title
Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments
Creator
NRID
1000040324222 1000040324222
ORCID
0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216
researchmap permalink
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Scopus Author ID
36927932200 36927932200
CreatorName
Ishida, Junichiro
Subject
Sabotage
Tournament
Fast track
Late selection
Abstract
This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents’ incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and then offer two distinct incentive schemes, fast track and late selection, to circumvent this problem. The present model offers a mechanism through which these two schemes arise in a unified framework.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
838
Date of Issued
2012-03
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/23406
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0838.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers